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ABSTRACT
In B2B contract enactment, cooperation should be taken
into account when modeling contractual commitments through
obligations. We advocate a directed deadline obligation ap-
proach, taking inspiration on international legislation over
trade procedures. Our proposal is based on authorizations
granted in specific states of an obligation lifecycle model.
Flexible deadlines provide an additional level of cooperation
between contractual agents. Moreover, agents increase their
decision-making options concerning obligations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent
systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
In cooperative Virtual Organizations, agents (enterprise
delegates) share their competences in a regulated way, through
commitments expressed as norms in contracts. The impor-
tance of pursuing a common goal demands for flexibility of
operations: agents should facilitate compliance of their part-
ners, because group success also benefits each agent’s private
goals, which are not limited to the business in progress, but
also concern future opportunities that may arise.
Many approaches to normative multi-agent systems are
abstracted away from their potential application domain,
and give deontic operators an universal semantics (e.g. dead-
line obligations are violated if the obliged fact does not hap-
pen before the deadline). We argue that in some domains –
such as business contracts – this approach is not desirable.
For instance, the UN Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (CISG) [4] establishes what parties
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Figure 1: Directed oblig. with liveline and deadline.
may do in case of deadline violations. In some cases, obliga-
tions may be fulfilled after the deadline (Article 48), which
may themselves be extended (Articles 47 and 63), denoting
a flexible and even cooperative facet of trade contracts.
We propose a different approach to model obligations in
MAS for the business contracts domain. Following a coop-
erative business performance posture, we argue that obliga-
tions should be directed, and that deadlines should be flex-
ible. In our model, authorizations are granted on specific
states of a lifecycle for time-framed directed obligations.
2. DIRECTED DEADLINE OBLIGATIONS
Deontic operators (such as obligations) can be modeled
with different features. Our proposal for handling contrac-
tual obligations combines deadline [1] and directed [3] obli-
gations. We also cope with the fact that anticipated fulfill-
ments are not always welcome (in CISG’s Article 52, this is
the case when storage costs are relevant). An obliged fact
should therefore be obtained within a time window, delim-
ited by a liveline and a deadline. A norm s → Ob,c(f, l, d)
indicates that if s then b (bearer) is obliged towards c (coun-
terparty) to bring about f (fact) between l (liveline) and d
(deadline). If b does not bring about f between l and d,
then c is authorized to react against b (see figure 1, where
the shaded area indicates the period of time within which
the achievement of f will certainly fulfill the obligation).
2.1 Temporal Violations
Figure 2 contains the state transition diagram for directed
obligations with livelines and deadlines. The obligation is
active (Ob,c(f, l, d)) when prescribed by a norm (whose sit-
uation sit became true). When l arises, it becomes pending,
unless an anticipated achievement of f occurs; in this case
there is a liveline violation (LViolb,c). If the deadline oc-
curs before f , there is a deadline violation (DViolb,c). If
f occurs while the obligation itself is not yet in a viola-
Figure 2: Lifecycle of a directed obligation with live-
line and deadline.
tion state (Violb,c), the obligation is fulfilled (Fulfb,c). The
counterparty’s reaction to a deadline violation will change
the obligation’s state if the agent chooses to deem the obli-
gation as violated, by denouncing this situation: Denc,b is
a denounce from c regarding the failure of b to comply with
his obligation. Once the fact being obliged is brought about,
the obligation cannot be violated. In case of an anticipated
achievement of f , we only need l to consider the obligation
as fulfilled. This does not, however, prevent the counter-
party from reacting to this early fulfillment in other less
strict ways (which can be captured by appropriate norms
whose situation is based on LViolb,c and other facts).
Using temporal logic (namely its before operator B), the
following relations express the semantics of our obligations:
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ (f B l) |= LViolb,c(f , l , d)
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ l ∧ (f B d) |= Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ (d B f ) |= DViolb,c(f , l , d)
• DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (f B Denc,b(f , l , d)) |= Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
• DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (Denc,b(f , l , d) B f ) |= Violb,c(f , l , d)
Belated fulfillments are allowed before denounces, accord-
ing to the fourth relation above.
2.2 Implementation with Rules
If we want to develop appropriate tools to monitor con-
tracts at run-time, we need to ground this semantics into a
reasoning engine capable of responding to events in a timely
fashion. Using a rule-based inference engine, we define the
following (forward-chaining) rules:
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ f ∧ ¬l → LViolb,c(f , l , d)
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ l ∧ f ∧ ¬d → Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
• Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ d ∧ ¬f → DViolb,c(f , l , d)
• DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ f ∧ ¬Denc,b(f , l , d)→ Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
• DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧Denc,b(f , l , d) ∧ ¬f → Violb,c(f , l , d)
Each relation of the form (e1 B e2) is translated into a
conjunction e1 ∧ ¬e2. This allows us to detect the moment
at which the before relation holds, and consequently to rea-
son about its consequences. Relative deadlines (common in
business contracts) require timestamping events, which al-
lows for a refinement on the implementation of these rules
(not shown for space restrictions).
3. DECISION-MAKING
The authorization approach described above enriches the
decision-making space. Besides their own commitments,
counterparties may decide over directed obligations after
deadlines (a violation state is determined by his choice to
denounce). In a contract, both parties bear obligations to
obtain certain facts, which benefit counterparties. A con-
tract contains further norms dependent on the fulfillment or
violation of previous obligations. In order to model the deci-
sion making process, we need to assess an agent’s valuations
on the obligation states and facts he is able to bring about.
Let va(f) and va(S) denote the valuation agent a makes of
fact f or state S, respectively (as in [2], where these are
used to check correctness of contracts, while we focus on the
course of contract execution). When valuating fulfillment
or violation states, agents should take into account what
further commitments those states trigger. Focusing on the
counterparty, for an obligation Ob,c(f, d) we have:
vc(Ob,c(f, d)) > 0 obl. is asset for counterparty
vc(f) > vc(Ob,c(f, d)) c benefits from f
vc(Fulfb,c(f , d)) ≤ 0 c may acquire obligs. after
vc(Violb,c(f , d)) ≥ 0 c may be compensated after
We may now say that c should denounce (and thus obtain
the violation) if vc(f ) + vc(Fulfb,c(f , d)) < vc(Violb,c(f , d)).
We consider that valuations may vary with time (it makes
sense to think of vc(f) as possibly decreasing with time).
Even when the above condition does not hold, c may still
opt for tolerating the less preferred situation of failure for
matters of conflicting goals. On the other hand, in environ-
ments enriched with social features agents can exploit, they
can decide to behave cooperatively even when they have to
bear a contained disadvantage – more than being altruistic,
agents may try to enhance their trust awareness in the com-
munity, from which they will benefit in future interactions.
4. SUMMARY
Most implementations of norms in MAS ignore the need
for having directed obligations from bearers to counterpar-
ties. This is because in those approaches obligations are seen
as (implicitly) directed from an agent to the normative sys-
tem itself. It is up to the system to detect violations and to
enforce the norms which are embedded in the environment.
On the contrary, contractual obligations are negotiated into
contracts and directed to specific contractual partners.
We started from previous theoretical approaches to model
authorizations, and developed a more concrete formalization
by linking authorizations with a flexible model of deadlines.
Obligation violations are now dependent on the counter-
party will to claim them. Agent decision-making is enriched
in our model, because both parties involved in directed obli-
gations may have a say regarding their violation. When
considering such obligations as interlinked through norms in
a contract, agents should evaluate the consequences of fulfill-
ment and violation states as stated in the contract. Further-
more, in “socially rich” environments, agents should explore
the value of future relationships by enhancing their perceived
trustworthiness and predisposition to facilitate compliance.
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